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Abstract 
India’s federal system is distinguished by tax and expenditure assignments that result in large 
vertical fiscal imbalances, and consequent transfers from the central government to the state 
governments.  Several channels are used for these transfers: the Finance Commission, the 
Planning Commission, and central government ministries.  We use panel data on center-state 
transfers to examine how the economic and political importance of the states influences the level 
and the composition of per capita transfers to the states, as well as differences in temporal 
patterns of Planning Commission and Finance Commission transfers. We find evidence that 
states with indications of greater bargaining power seem to receive larger per capita transfers, 
and that there is greater temporal variation in Planning Commission transfers. 
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I Introduction 
There are two broad strands of research with respect to center-state transfers in India. 
One seeks to improve the normative criteria for making transfers, while the other tries to 
understand the factors that determine actual transfer patterns. The former approach has been 
dominant in policy-making, but suffers from a lack of detailed analysis of what actually does 
happen.1 The second approach, aside from its intrinsic interest, helps to address this weakness. 
Focusing on a positive analysis of intergovernmental transfer patterns highlights some of the 
political economy features of transfers. By this we mean simply that both the design and the 
implementation of a transfer system will be affected by distributional concerns that are in the 
realm of political bargaining. This “political bargaining” view of federalism is very general 
(Riker, 1975), and intergovernmental transfers are just one aspect of it. However, center-state 
fiscal transfers are a particular, quantifiable expression of the complex bargaining relationships 
between the central and state governments in India. 
In this paper, we use some illustrative panel data on center-state transfers to examine how 
the economic and political importance of the states may influence the level and the composition 
of per capita transfers to the states, as well as differences in temporal patterns of Planning 
Commission and Finance Commission transfers. We find evidence that states with indications of 
greater bargaining power seem to receive larger per capita transfers, and that there is greater 
temporal variation in Planning Commission transfers. Our work extends Rao and Singh (2002), 
and is related to recent work such as Dasgupta, Dhillon and Dutta (2001), and Biswas and Marjit 
(2000). All these papers address different political economy aspects of India’s federal system of 
intergovernmental transfers.2 Since the data we use only covers the ten-year period 1983-1992, 
our analysis is chiefly meant to be illustrative of what can be done with more comprehensive 
data sets. In performing the empirical work, we have combined earlier data sets from Rao and 
Singh (2002) and Biswas and Marjit (2000). 
  To capture economic importance, we use overall economic size of states, as measured 
by State Domestic Product, as a simple measure.  We also consider demographic size 
(population) as a political variable, since the size of a state (viewed in a simplifying assumption 
as an irreducible unit) affects its political weight. In addition, we use three more explicit 
measures of political influence: degree of representation in the ruling party or coalition; 
alignment between the ruling party at the center and a state, and representation of different states 
in the ministerial cabinet. Constructing these political variables represents the most time-
intensive aspect of extending our data set for potential future work. 
Section II reviews some key features of Indian fiscal federalism and the system of center-
state transfers, as motivation for our analysis, including the roles of the Finance Commission, the 
Planning Commission, and the central government, through its various ministries, in making 
transfers. We particularly analyze the functioning of the Finance Commission, because of its 
                                                 
1 The normative approach can also be criticized for shortcomings in conceptualization, irrespective of 
implementation issues that come up in a positive analysis. 
2 A larger literature, beginning with Rao (1981), examines the political economy of expenditures and deficits at 
different levels of government. Examples are Karnik (1990), Dutta (2000), Khemani (2002), and Rajaraman (2004). 
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constitutional status, and the importance of its tax-sharing rules. In Section III, we present our 
empirical framework and results. Section IV concludes.   
II  Key Features of Indian Fiscal Federalism  
The Indian Constitution, in its seventh schedule, assigns the powers and, by implication, 
expenditure functions of both the center and the states. The schedule specifies the exclusive 
powers of the center in the Union list; exclusive powers of the states in the State list; and those 
falling under the joint jurisdiction are placed in the Concurrent list.  All residual expenditure 
powers are assigned to the center.  The nature of the assignments is typical of federal nations.  
The assignment of tax powers is based on the principle of separation, i.e., tax categories are 
exclusively assigned either to the center or to the states.  Most broad-based taxes have been 
assigned to the center, including taxes on non-agricultural income. Out of a long list of taxes 
assigned to the states, only the tax on the sale and purchase of goods has been significant for 
state revenues.  The center has also been assigned all residual tax powers.   
The Constitution recognized that its assignment of tax powers and expenditure functions 
would create imbalances between expenditure needs and abilities to raise revenue.  The 
imbalances could be both vertical, among different levels of government, and horizontal, among 
different units within a sub-central level.  Therefore, the Constitution provided for the 
assignment of revenues (as contrasted to assignment of tax powers) through sharing of the 
proceeds of certain centrally levied taxes with the states and making grants to the states from the 
Consolidated Fund of India.  The shares of the center and the states and their allocation among 
different states of both the taxes are determined by the Finance Commission appointed by the 
President of India every five years, or earlier as needed. In addition to tax devolution, the 
Finance Commission is also required to recommend grants to the states in need of assistance 
under Article 275.  
The result of the Indian assignments of tax and expenditure authority, as well as their 
implementation in practice, has been a substantial vertical fiscal imbalance.  In 2002-2003, the 
states on average raised about 38 percent of government revenues, but incurred about 58 percent 
of expenditures.  Transfers from the center made up the balance.3 In fact, the ability of the states 
to finance their current expenditures from their own sources of revenue has seen a long-run 
decline, from 69 percent in 1955-1956 to 52 percent in 2002-2003. While the expenditure shares 
of central and state governments suggest a fairly high degree of decentralization, states’ control 
over expenditure policies is less than the figures indicate since about 15 per cent of states’ 
expenditures was on central sector and centrally sponsored schemes. These are specific purpose 
transfer schemes administered by various central ministries.   
                                                 
3 The figures focus on current expenditures and revenues. Borrowing provides an alternative source of funds for the 
states. The Constitution allows the states to borrow from the market, but stipulates that when a state is indebted to 
the center, it has to obtain the center’s permission for market borrowing.  As all the state governments are indebted 
to the center, states have no discretion. In practice, the Planning Commission, in consultation with the Union 
Finance Ministry and the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), has determined the total quantity of states’ borrowing, and 
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There are three channels of current transfers from the center to the states.  First, as 
mentioned earlier, the Finance Commission decides on tax shares and makes grants.  Second, the 
Planning Commission makes grants and loans for implementing development plans.  Third, there 
are the central sector and centrally sponsored schemes, in which various ministries give grants to 
their counterparts in the states for specified projects either wholly funded by the center (central 
sector projects) or requiring the states to share a proportion of the cost (centrally sponsored 
schemes). 
  Historically, as development planning gained emphasis, the Planning Commission 
became a major dispenser of funds to the states.  Before 1969, plan transfers were project-based. 
Since then, the distribution has been done on the basis of a consensus formula decided by the 
National Development Council (NDC).4 Since central ministries still wished to influence states’ 
outlays on selected items of expenditure, they increasingly used specific purpose transfers (the 
third category). These are supposed to be monitored by the Planning Commission. 
So far, eleven Finance Commissions have made recommendations and, barring a few 
exceptions, these have been accepted by the central government.  However, the working of these 
Commissions, their design of the transfer system, and the approach and methodology adopted by 
them have come in for criticism.  Much of the policy discussion and research in this regard falls 
under our normative categorization, though there has been some analysis of equity outcomes that 
cuts across positive and normative concerns.5 The Eleventh Finance Commission did receive a 
broader charge, and made recommendations accordingly, but whether this marks a significant 
institutional departure remains to be seen. Conversely, the liberalization of India’s economy has 
altered the conceptual underpinnings of the Planning Commission, which earlier grew in 
importance as a result of India’s adoption of a planned development strategy.  
The typical restriction of the Finance Commissions to the non-plan side of the budget has 
led to a number of problems, which are only now being examined or addressed.  First, larger 
transfers through the Planning Commission have significantly reduced the ability of the Finance 
Commission to achieve redistribution for horizontal fiscal equity across states.  Second, it has 
prevented a comprehensive periodic review of state finances.  Third, conceptually, the plan and 
non-plan distinction is unsound. Besides poor co-ordination, the separate treatment of plan and 
non-plan expenditure needs, and the emphasis on having large plans have led to inadequate 
provision for, and maintenance of, assets created under previous plans.  From the states’ point of 
                                                 
4 The NDC is chaired by the Prime Minister and its members include all cabinet ministers at the center, Chief 
Ministers of the states, and members of the Planning Commission. According to the recent formula, 30 per cent of 
the funds available for distribution are kept apart for the special category states.  Assistance to them is given on the 
basis of plan projects formulated by them and 90 per cent of the transfer is given as grants, with the remainder as 
loans.  The 70 per cent of the funds available to the major states is distributed with 60 per cent weight assigned to 
population, 25 per cent to per capita SDP, 7.5 per cent to fiscal management and the remaining 7.5 per cent to 
special problems of states.  Of the 25 per cent weight assigned to per capita SDP, the major portion of the funds, 20 
per cent is allocated only to the states with less than average per capita SDP on the basis of the “inverse” formula; 
the remaining 5 per cent of the funds is assigned to all the states according to the “distance” formula.  For the major 
states, assistance is given by way of grants and loans in the ratio of 30:70.  The transfers given to the states for plan 
purposes are not related to the required size or composition of plan investments. 
5 See Rao and Singh (2002) for a summary of such work, and additional references. 
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view, separate plan and non-plan assessments gave them the opportunity to submit different 
projections to the two Commissions – an overestimated non-plan budgetary gap to the Finance 
Commission and overestimated saving in the non-plan account to the Planning Commission.  
The Planning Commission functions as follows. It works out five-year-plan investments 
for each sector of the economy and each state.  With this as background, the states work out their 
respective annual plans for each year, based on the estimated resource availability, which 
includes the balance from current revenue, contributions of public enterprises, additional 
resource mobilization, plan grants and loans, market borrowings and other miscellaneous capital 
receipts. The state plans are then approved by the Planning Commission.  Thus, in the final 
analysis, given the amount of central transfers to the states as determined by the formula, at the 
margin it is mainly the own resource position of the states that determines their plan sizes. The 
conceptual foundation of the Commission’s working has also been criticized.6 
Assistance given to states through central sector and centrally sponsored schemes is in 
some respects the most controversial form of transfers.  These transfers are discretionary, which 
is not in itself a problem. However, there is a proliferation of ad hoc schemes, and their 
articulation with Planning Commission transfers is very poor, although they often are meant to 
serve similar or overlapping objectives. Furthermore they can incorporate inefficient 
conditionalities, such as requirements on staffing patterns, which tend to distort the states’ own 
spending.   
 
III  Empirical Framework and Results 
Our goal is to use a parsimonious framework to try to explain the observed pattern of 
center-state fiscal transfers.  We restrict attention to explicit current transfers. By a parsimonious 
framework, we mean the use of regressions with just a few key variables that describe the 
economic, demographic and political characteristics of the states.  We use data from the National 
Institute for Public Finance and Policy (NIPFP), on fiscal transfers from the center to the 14 
major states.  The sample excludes the so-called Special Category states, and the small state of 
Goa, which was upgraded from Union Territory status.  We have, for comparability with 
previous work (Rao and Singh, 2002), and due to data-gathering constraints restricted our 
empirical analysis in this paper to the 10-year period from 1983-84 to 1992-93.  Hence, our 
analysis should be chiefly viewed as illustrative of what can be done with longer data sets.7 The 
NIPFP data set also included figures on State Domestic Products in current and constant prices, 
and in total and per capita terms. We recovered state population figures from the ratio of per 
capita and total values for each year and deflators from the ratio of current to constant price 
figures. These were used to convert the fiscal data to constant price terms (with 1981 as the base 
year), and to per capita terms wherever required. We describe the fiscal data in more detail 
below. 
                                                 
6 Again, see Rao and Singh (2002) for an overview. 
7 The main data constraint is in constructing the political variables used. 
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We also use data on political characteristics of the states.  For our first political variable, 
we use data on the share of different states’ parliamentary representation8 in the ruling party or 
ruling coalition. This data is constructed from Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1995).  The period of 
estimation included majority Congress governments from 1980 to 1984 and 1985 to 1989, as 
well as a minority Congress government from 1991 to 1996.  From 1989 to 1991 (a period of 
about a year and a half), there were two Janata Dal minority governments).  The existence of 
‘outside support’ for minority governments introduces some noise into using the share variable 
as a measure of political strength of the state in the central process, but for the present paper we 
work with this variable.9  For our second political variable, we use data on the control of the 
various state governments, using this to create a variable that takes the value one if and only if 
the party at the center and the state level are the same in a particular year, and zero otherwise.10 
Our third measure of political influence is a ‘lobbying power’ variable based on representation of 
different states in the ministerial cabinet. ‘Lobbying power’ for a state is calculated as the 
summation of proportional representation of various categories of ministers in the cabinet 
contributed by the state in question, normalized in terms of state population.11 To some extent 
the second and third variables capture similar effects, so we include them as alternatives in 
separate regressions, along with the first political variable. 
We now describe the data on transfers in greater detail.  The table below illustrates the 
tax data we have, using the original (current price) data from Andhra Pradesh for 1983-84.  For 
our present analysis, we consider only the aggregate of shared taxes.  Recall that these are 
centrally collected taxes, which are constitutionally required to be shared with the states.  The 
Finance Commission determines both the aggregate share of the states, and the distribution 
among the states. 
 
Total Tax Revenue =  118440.6  
  Own Tax Revenue +  82352.0  
  Shared Taxes =   36088.6  
    Shared Income Taxes +    9069.5  
                                                 
8 We used figures for the lower house only, since this is the main legislative body. The upper house has limited, 
though not completely negligible powers. 
9 Ideally, we would like to calculate a power index, such as the Banzhaf Index, to measure the political clout of 
different states in the ruling party/coalition at the center, but such calculations will require implementing a complex 
computer program, which we have obtained, but not yet tried. 
10 This data was made available to us by Bhaskar Dutta, who used it in an analysis of the state governments’ 
expenditure patterns (Dutta, 2000). The data is also in Butler, Lahiri and Roy (1995). Again, the existence of 
coalition governments in states can make the matching variable we use somewhat less reliable. 
11 This variable is the same as that used is Biswas and Marjit (2000), and is taken from their paper. 
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    Shared Estate Duty +    107.5  
    Share of Union Excise Duties =      26911.7  
      Basic Union Excise Duties +  23294.2  
   Additional  Excise  Duties  3617.5  
 
The data on non-tax revenue of the states is also available broken down by categories.  
The table below illustrates the nature of the original data, also using figures from Andhra 
Pradesh, again at current prices for 1983-84.  The four grant categories are further disaggregated 
in the original data, but we do not present that disaggregated data here. 
 
Total Non Tax Revenue =  57966.50  
  Total Own Non Tax Revenue +  30942.44  
  Grants from Central Government =  27024.06  
    Non Plan Grants +  6317.80  
    Grants for State Plan Schemes +  7862.07  
    Grants for Central Plan Schemes +  3108.55  
    Grants for Centrally Sponsored Schemes  9735.65 
 
For the empirical analysis in this paper, we examine transfers in four categories, as 
indicated below: 
1. Shared Taxes  
2. Non Plan Grants  
3. Grants for Central Plan Schemes  
4. Grants for Centrally Sponsored Schemes 
The sum of these four categories constitutes total transfers.  In Rao and Singh (2002), we 
aggregated the first two categories into “statutory transfers,” and the final two categories into 
“discretionary transfers,” but here we examine them all separately. Summary statistics and 
correlations for the data (Table 9) suggest that, in general, neither lack of variation nor high 
correlation between independent variables is likely to be a problem. 
We used the LIMDEP7 program to estimate fixed effects models for various 
specifications.  We report selected results in detail in this paper, and briefly discuss other 
specifications. All regressions were run for each of the four categories of transfers (in per capita 
terms) listed above, at 1981 prices. The independent variables used were State Domestic Product 
at 1981 prices (SDP), per capita constant price SDP (SDPPC), population (POPN), the 
proportion of the ruling party’s Members of Parliament (lower house only) coming from a 
particular state (PROPN), the variable measuring whether the same party was in power at the 
center and the state level (MATCH), and the variable measuring lobbying power (LP). In 
incorporating the latter three political variables, we fixed them at the levels that were current in 
the year that decisions were made by the relevant commission. These variables are therefore 
denoted PROP_FIX, MAT_FIX, and LP_FIX respectively.  By ‘fixing’ the political variables in 
this fashion we attempt to capture the five-year cycle of decision-making that affects both the 
Finance Commission and the Planning Commission. (These cycles are no longer 
contemporaneous). Hence, for regressions with shared taxes and non-plan grants as the 
dependent variables, the political variables are fixed at the levels that are current in the year the 
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Finance Commissions’ decisions were made. The political variables in regression specifications 
(3) and (4) were set so as to be current in the year the Planning Commission decisions were 
made. We also ran regressions using the original political variables, but the results with the 
‘fixed’ variables were more plausible, and only those are reported. 
Dummy variables for various Finance Commissions (FC7 and FC8) and Planning 
Commissions (PC6, PC7 and PC8) are also included. Tables 1-4 report regression results with 
PROP_FIX and MAT_FIX, while Tables 5-8 report regression results with the second political 
variable replaced by LP_FIX.   In addition to these independent variables, state fixed effects 
were also included.  The model without state fixed effects was always rejected in the standard F-
tests, and therefore those results are not reported.  We tried three specifications: linear, loglinear, 
and translog. However, we report the results for the first two specifications only, since the results 
for third model did not differ much from those for the second.  In each case the political 
variables were unchanged across the linear and loglinear specifications.  All estimations were 
carried out using the White heteroscedasticity-corrected variance covariance matrix. 
Linear Specification  
Table 1 reports the results for the linear specification for each of the four dependent 
variables. Note that, since the three independent variables SDP, SDPPC and POPN are 
multiplicatively related12, the coefficients of these variables cannot directly give us marginal 
impacts of changes in state characteristics.  However, these marginal effects can be calculated as 
in Rao and Singh (2002). The regression for shared taxes per capita (1) has the coefficients for 
population and PROP_FIX statistically significant. Population has a positive effect on per capita 
shared taxes. The demographic size of a state can be viewed as an indicator of its political 
influence. The PROP_FIX variable captures the impact of the degree of representation in the 
ruling party/coalition on shared taxes per capita. The differences across Finance Commissions 
are not statistically significant, though the dummy coefficients are not negligible in magnitude. 
The overall fit of the regression is reasonable. The regression for non-plan grants per capita (2) 
has only the coefficient of SDPPC (State Domestic Product per capita at 1981 prices) 
significantly different from zero. The overall fit of the regression is reasonable though lower 
than that for regression (1). 
 
 Regression (3) presents the results for Grants for Central Plan Schemes as the dependent 
variable. Here, the coefficients for population, per capita state domestic product and the 7
th 
Planning Commission dummy are found to be statistically significant and positive. Regression 
(4) presents the results for Grants for Centrally Sponsored Schemes as the dependent variable. 
Here, the coefficients for population and the 8
th Planning Commission dummy are found to be 
statistically significantly different from zero. It is interesting to note that neither of the political 
variables is significant in these two regressions. Though the coefficient of the population 
variable can’t directly give us the marginal impacts, the sign of the coefficient in regressions (3) 
and (4) suggests that demographically larger states receive more of these transfers regardless of 
the political characteristics of the state. 
 
                                                 
12 Because of the units we have used for the three variables, the relationship is SDP81 = POPN*SDPPC81*10. 
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  Table 2 reports the fixed effects coefficients for the fourteen states, for each of the 
regressions (1) - (4) reported in Table 1. The coefficients for the shared taxes regression vary 
from –28.9 to 43.8. However, most of the coefficients are not statistically significantly different 
from zero. Uttar Pradesh is the only state with a large negative fixed effect (though it is not 
statistically significant). Bihar, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have very 
low positive fixed effects coefficients. The variation in the estimated fixed effects points towards 
potentially important determinants of transfers that are missing from the regressions. One such 
missing variable is the poverty rate. Higher poverty ratios are reflected in the positive fixed 
effects for Bihar, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan. However, a sizeable negative fixed effect for 
U.P., the fourth ‘BIMARU’ state does not fit the relative poverty explanation. One would expect 
higher poverty ratios to be reflected in fixed effects that are positive. 
 
 The fixed effects for the non plan grants per capita regression are all negative and range 
from –7.1 (Orissa) to –63.0 (U.P). Most of the coefficients are statistically significant. The fixed 
effects for grants for central plan schemes per capita range from –8.9 (Rajasthan) to –38.7 (U. P.) 
and are smaller (in absolute value) than those for regression (2). A noteworthy feature is that the 
coefficients display some of the same patterns across states as in regression (2). Column (4) 
represents the fixed effects for Grants for Centrally sponsored Schemes per capita. The 
coefficients display considerable variation, ranging from -54.4 (U.P.) to 3.5 (Haryana). However, 
most of the coefficients are not statistically significant. It is interesting to note that the 
differences in the estimated fixed effects mark the greatest difference between regressions for the 
various categories of transfers, rather than the political, economic and demographic measures.  
 
Loglinear Specification  
  The results for the loglinear specification are reported in Table 3, with the corresponding 
fixed effects in Table 4. The log of SDP is omitted from these regressions since it is a sum of the 
logs of population and per capita SDP. The political variables are not included in log form. Now, 
the coefficients of SDP per capita and population are precisely the elasticities of per capita 
transfers with respect to these variables, keeping the other variable constant. The significance of 
the political variable that captures the state’s degree of representation in the ruling 
party/coalition (PROP_FIX) is in line with that in the linear regressions. The coefficient of 
PROP_FIX is positive and significant only for the per capita shared taxes regression. This result 
is surprising since one would expect discretionary transfers ((3) and (4)) to display some 
political influence. The variable that measures the alignment between the ruling party at the 
center and the state (MAT_FIX) continues to be insignificant. 
 
  One result worth noting is the large and positive coefficient of population in the case of 
regressions (3) and (4). As noted earlier, population may be viewed as an indicator of political 
influence, solely due to the size of the state and regardless of its political influence. Furthermore, 
it is important to note that the coefficients for the 6
th and the 7
th Planning commission dummies 
remain positive and statistically significantly different from zero. The 8
th Planning Commission 
dummy is positive and significant for regression (4).13 
                                                 
13 This result on the temporal variation in Planning Commission transfers carries over to a more general translog 
specification, the details of which are available from the authors. 
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  Thus, broadly speaking, the results for the loglinear specification appear to be consistent 
with those of the linear specification. The importance of the PROP_FIX variable in the shared 
taxes regression is an unexpected result. The fixed effects for the log linear specification (Table 
4) display patterns across states that suggest that factors missing from the regressions might be 
important determinants of transfers. However, it is possible that the variation in the fixed effects 
is a result of misspecification of regressions. The complicated formulas used for shared taxes 
might not be adequately captured by the linear or the loglinear specifications. 
 
Alternative Specification  
  We re-estimated the regressions with an alternative measure of political influence, 
namely, the Biswas and Marjit (2000) ‘lobbying power’ variable: these results are reported in 
Tables 5-8. As noted, the regressions are run with the variable fixed at the level that is current in 
the year that decisions are made. Table 5 reports the linear specification results, with the 
corresponding fixed effects reported in Table 6. Compared to the previous linear specification 
results, the population variable is significant only for grants for centrally sponsored schemes. 
The ‘lobbying power’ variable (LP_FIX) has a positive and significant effect for grants for 
central plan schemes per capita. This result corroborates our hypothesis that discretionary 
transfers would be subject to political influence. The results on the temporal variation in 
Planning Commission transfers carry over from the earlier linear specification results in Table 1. 
 
  Table 7 reports the results for the loglinear specification with lobbying power as one of 
the independent variables, with corresponding fixed effects in Table 8. The lobbying power 
variable is positive and statistically significant for shared taxes per capita and grants for central 
plan schemes. This specification provides stronger evidence (compared to the linear case) that 
political variables matter. Another noteworthy result is the large positive influence of the 
population variable on grants for central plan schemes and grants for centrally sponsored 
schemes. This is consistent with the results in Table 1 and 3, which did not include the ‘lobbying 
power’ variable. Furthermore, coefficients for PC6 and PC7 continue to be positive and 
statistically significant. The coefficients for PC8 are also statistically significant for regression 
(3) and (4). 
 
   
IV Conclusion 
The motivation for our analysis is the perspective of a federal system as a constitutional 
or political bargain.  Even though India was not formed out of an explicit bargaining process 
(except to some extent with respect to the inclusion of the princely states at the time of 
independence), the perspective of bargaining is commonly applied informally to resource sharing 
among the different constituent governments. The states, do not have sovereign status, and, 
constitutionally speaking, exist at the discretion of the central government. Nevertheless, they 
represent real and significant political groupings, based on language and culture.  They are the 
subnational political units that matter above all, more so than caste or class.  The recent election 
results in India would seem to bear this contention out to some degree. In any case, center-state 
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transfers in India provide a useful data set with which to test hypotheses on functioning of a 
federal system as an ongoing political bargain.   
Using a panel data set on center-state transfers, we analyzed the extent to which the 
economic and political importance of the states influences the pattern of per capita transfers to 
the states. We innovated from previous work in the way we included political variables to 
correspond to the decision cycles of the Finance and Planning Commissions. We also introduced 
dummies for the various Finance Commissions and Planning Commissions to study the temporal 
patterns in their transfers. All regressions were run alternatively using the four categories of 
transfers (in per capita terms), at 1981 prices. Overall, the results suggest that states with greater 
bargaining power, as proxied by our political variables, tend to receive larger per capita 
transfers. The positive estimated effects of the demographic size of the states suggest that 
population may well be an indicator of political influence, solely due to the size of the state and 
irrespective of its political influence. We also found evidence for temporal variation in Planning 
Commission transfers, which bears further investigation. Since our data set is restricted to a ten-
year period, our findings should be taken as illustrative of an empirical methodology that can and 
should be extended to longer time periods and more recent data. 
Our methodological emphasis in this paper is a positive analysis, to examine the overall 
outcomes emerging from a complex and heterogeneous set of institutions and motivations. 
However, if these outcomes exhibit patterns, predictable or unexpected, work such as ours may 
ultimately aid in the normative task of designing a more effective set of institutions for 
intergovernmental transfers in India.  An additional hypothesis may also be that a system with 
large vertical transfers is inevitably subject to political pressures and unintended effects, 
implying a need to reconfigure the underlying tax assignments to achieve a better match with 
expenditure responsibilities at different levels of government. 
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 Table 1: Linear Specification Coefficients 




































































































0.62767 0.40680 0.57432  0.36781 
 
 
Note: All financial variables are measured in 1981 Rupees 
t-ratios in parentheses 
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Table 2: Linear Specification Fixed Effects 





















Andhra Pradesh  10.910          -39.461  -19.300  -21.408 
Bihar     1.881           -45.672  -26.341  -31.544 
Gujarat  13.727          -39.866  -20.776  -8.431 
Haryana  28.050          -38.214  -13.169  3.512 
Karnataka           21.740          -38.829  -15.633  -11.032 
Kerala     34.928          -26.263  -13.149  -5.305 
Madhya Pradesh   9.570           -39.903  -20.598  -21.309 
Maharashtra      2.772           -49.209  -24.845  -23.750 
Orissa       43.827          -7.090  -9.529  0.355 
Punjab     29.224          -42.359  -15.543  -2.996 
Rajasthan          22.673          -28.140  -8.919  -8.323 
Tamil Nadu     24.510          -39.106  -18.238  -17.490 
Uttar Pradesh  -28.973  -63.025  -38.744  -54.396 
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Table 3: Log Linear Specification Coefficients 






































































      

















R-squared      
0.62894 
 




Note: All financial variables are measured in 1981 Rupees 
t-ratios in parentheses 
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Table 4: Log Linear Specification Fixed Effects 





















Andhra Pradesh  -134.774  -216.462  -139.406  -142.956 
Bihar     -133.230  -216.202  -148.432  -155.437 
Gujarat -137.118  -214.834  -132.500  -120.816 
Haryana -112.591  -196.122  -100.730  -79.268 
Karnataka    -126.987  -215.163  -129.481  -125.892 
Kerala     -107.746  -198.240  -118.515  -110.326 
Madhya Pradesh     -133.876  -215.909  -140.441  -142.940 
Maharashtra      -151.092  -229.624  -148.085  -146.593 
Orissa       -98.262  -179.618  -116.510  -107.004 
Punjab     -117.162  -201.732  -107.908  -92.356 
Rajasthan          -122.738  -203.490  -122.254  -123.130 
Tamil Nadu     -123.938  -216.607  -136.226  -136.638 
Uttar Pradesh  -153.513  -229.245  -162.500  -173.274 
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Table 5: Linear Specification Coefficients 


































































































2        0.62442  0.40487  0.58806  0.36670 
 
 
Note: All financial variables are measured in 1981 Rupees 
t-ratios in parentheses 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10 % level (all two-sided) 
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Table 6: Linear Specification Fixed Effects 





















Andhra Pradesh  18.101  -42.794  -16.358  -23.100 
Bihar     14.523  -51.113  -20.464  -34.999 
Gujarat 19.323  -43.244  -17.363  -10.795 
Haryana 29.017  -40.767  -14.108  3.031 
Karnataka    25.259  -41.362  -14.619  -11.820 
Kerala     38.308  -28.555  -11.734  -6.200 
Madhya Pradesh     19.598  -44.604  -16.191  -23.989 
Maharashtra      9.674  -53.562  -22.847  -25.232 
Orissa       49.105  -10.263  -7.824  -1.136 
Punjab     32.606  -44.941  -12.779  -4.950 
Rajasthan          27.157  -31.348  -8.145  -9.365 
Tamil Nadu     31.203  -42.448  -15.462  -19.017 
Uttar Pradesh  -10.872  -71.115  -31.683  -58.216 
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Table 7: Log Linear Specification Coefficients 







































































      

















2        0.63559  0.40718  0.61402  0.36963 
 
Note: All financial variables are measured in 1981 Rupees 
t-ratios in parentheses 
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10 % level (all two-sided) 
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Table 8: Log Linear Specification Fixed Effects 






















Andhra Pradesh  -151.649  -227.047  -137.112  -144.567 
Bihar     -145.388  -229.680  -143.444  -158.450 
Gujarat -158.120  -224.259  -130.445  -122.401 
Haryana -144.445  -200.924  -105.801  -77.468 
Karnataka    -148.907  -224.091  -129.541  -126.374 
Kerala     -130.462  -205.685  -118.721  -110.648 
Madhya Pradesh     -148.841  -228.226  -136.703  -145.325 
Maharashtra      -169.509  -241.940  -145.793  -148.341 
Orissa       -119.145  -188.486  -116.113  -107.801 
Punjab     -144.216  -207.066  -109.060  -92.244 
Rajasthan          -144.249  -213.320  -122.390  -123.728 
Tamil Nadu     -141.993  -226.876  -134.238  -138.050 
Uttar Pradesh  -164.599  -245.402  -156.999  -176.494 

















Table 9: Summary Statistics 
 
 








Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Shared Taxes per capita (Rs.) 
 
50.04   9.66  
Non Plan Grants per capita (Rs.) 
 
7.74 8.15 
Grants for Central Plan Schemes per capita (Rs.) 
 
5.68 3.96 
Grants for Centrally Sponsored Schemes per capita (Rs.) 
 
12.93 4.94 
State Domestic Product (Rs. 10,000,000) 
 
995,824 549,135 






Match between central and state ruling parties 
 
 0.55 0.50  





0.14E-03 0.86E-04  
 
 




Correlations of Independent Variables 
 
 
  SDP SDP  per 
capita
Population Match Proportion Lobbying 
Power
SDP            
SDP per capita  0.1826  
Population  0.7721 -0.3801  
Match  0.1388 0.0654 0.0999  
Proportion  0.4853 -0.2291 0.6210 0.4128  
Lobbying Power  -0.1766 -0.1089 -0.0890 0.3042 0.3188 
 
 